Adaptation and Selection
In a celebrated letter to his sister and theologian Simone Weil, dated March 1940, André Weil (writing from a military prison in Paris) expounded on the powerful yet transient role that analogy plays in mathematics as a precursor to unification. He does this through another layer of analogy, that of the avatars of Vishnu, each of which reveal different facets of the deity. Weil had in mind various connections-yet to be supported by theorem and proof-that he was finding between problems in number theory and algebraic geometry, connections that today are encoded in one of the grandest current efforts in mathematics: the pursuit of the Langlands program, a Vishnu of mathematics. The value of analogy in pure mathematics in promoting identification of common foundations extends into its dealing with physical reality (even this aspect is evident in the Langlands program, realized through recent connections made with quantum field theory). This was already understood by Poincaré when he wrote that "the mathematical facts worthy of being studied are those which, by their analogy with other facts, are capable of leading us to the knowledge of a physical law." The pursuit of a "biological law" (or even agreement on what would define one) is proving to be something of a challenge. But adaptation may be a context that supports such an achievement. Loosely construed, it is the collection of dynamics yielding evolved or learned traits that contribute positively to survival and propagation. Adaptation assumes a bewildering array of "avatars," spanning evolution by natural selection, reinforcement learning, Bayesian inference, and supervised machine learning, of which neural networks are perhaps the most explicitly adaptive. In all of these instances adaptation implies some element of (1) design or optimization, (2) differential selection or success, and (3) historical correlation between evolved trait and environment that grows stronger through time. Each of these elements has inspired mathematical descriptions, and it is only in the past decade that we have become aware that several fields concerned with the formal analysis of adaptation are in fact deeply analogous (an awareness that has been engendered by mathematics) and that these analogies suggest a form of unification that might be codified as a "biological law."
It is very difficult to discuss adaptation without considering natural selection, and in many treatments they are effectively synonymous. Stephen Jay Gould bemoaned the ambiguity whereby the word adaptation can be interpreted as both noun and verb. The noun adaptation refers to the constellation of properties that confer some locally optimal character on an agent, whereas the verb adaptation describes the process by which agents adapt through time to their environments. It is the latter active process that has attracted the greater mathematical effort and includes the often counterintuitive properties that are found in population dynamics. Adaptation at equilibrium (the noun form) simply requires that optimality be demonstrated, often through variational techniques derived from engineering. Examples include the optical properties of the lens, the excitability properties of neural membranes, and the kinematic properties of limbs and joints. They all fall into this equilibrium class of adaptive explanation and are as diverse in their mathematical treatments as material constraints demand. In this article, however, we focus on the genuinely novel dynamical features of the adaptive process, the extraordinary diversity of systems in which they continue to be realized, and the associated mathematical ideas. The context is generally one of populations evolving in distribution, and in this broad review we touch on the techniques of information geometry, evolutionary game theory, and mixtures of discrete dynamics and probability theory.
Selection Systems

Continuous Selection for Diploid Species
A historically accurate place to start exploring adaptation is with the continuous selection equation for diploid genomes from population genetics. In this setting we are interested in the time evolution of the distribution of genomic structures in the population as influenced by both endogenous and exogenous factors.
Consider a single coding site in a genome, which can assume multiple, discrete genetic forms or alleles, A i . For a diploid organism (one whose genetic profile is encoded in two copies of each gene), each site will be represented by a pair of values (A i , A j ). The time evolution of a genome in terms of the frequency in the population of the various alleles is determined by the coefficients of its net growth rate in competition with a population of genomes. This growth rate is set by the so-called Malthusian fitness parameter.
Let us denote the frequency of allele i by x i ∈ [0, 1] and collect these frequencies in vector x, which then has nonnegative elements that sum to 1.
Adaptive evolution proceeds according tȯ
where M is the matrix of real-valued Malthusian parameters for the set of n genomes. A positive derivative reflects an increasing frequency of an allele and is associated with a higher than average value for a given type in the M matrix. Rewritten, with m i (x) = (Mx) i , this gives the so-called replicator equatioṅ
. This is a differential equation on the invariant simplex S n whose points represent all possible distribution of alleles, and it has deep correspondences across a range of fields. We shall come back to the importance of the replicator equation once we have described a few more properties of the more general selection equation. The dynamics of (1) is determined by the properties of its stable equilibria. These are conventionally analyzed through the (weighted) incidence matrix of an undirected graph, which can serve as the matrix of Consider the subsimplex I ⊆ {1, . . . , k}. The barycenter of the face S n (I) is defined as p = (1/k, . . . , 1/k, 0, . . . , 0) (the average of extremal coordinates). The mean fitness restricted to this face is
Over the set of possible frequency vectors (having only positive entries with sum 1) this takes its maximal value 1 − (1/2k) at p, which shows that p is asymptotically stable within S n (I). If i ∉ I, then there is some j ∈ I with m ij = 0. Hence,
Thus, p is not only saturated (maximal) but also asymptotically stable in S n . Furthermore, for any system with n − i alleles there are at most 2 i stable equilibria. In this context, adaptation is a description of the changing frequencies of competing "species" or genotypes whose stable fixed points are governed by the values of a Malthusian matrix. This matrix is assumed to encode all of those factors that contribute to both mortality and increased viability or replicative potential.
A natural way to think about the process of adaptation is in terms of a flow on an appropriate manifold or the setting of information geometry. This framework was first introduced to population dynamics and the study of adaptation by Shahshahani. It is most easily treated for the symmetric case of the replicator equation. If we letẋ i = m i (x) = ∂V /∂x i be a Euclidean gradient vector field on R n , then the replicator equation is a Shahshahani gradient on the interior of S n with the same potential function V . To be specific, the change in V is equal to the variance of the values of m i (x) of the replicator equation:
This result is referred to as Fisher's fundamental theorem of natural selection, wherein the change in the potential-or, obversely, the increase in the mean population fitness-is proportional to the variance in fitness. Hence, populations will always increase their adaptedness assuming that there remains latent variability in a population.
Information and Adaptation: Game Dynamics
We have so far considered diploid population genetics, but this framework can as easily be thought of as describing haploid (single-genome, or "asexual," speciation) game dynamics. In this case the entries m ij of the Malthusian matrix M describe payoffs associated with competition between an agent A i and an agent A j that meet with a probability x i x j . In the case of payoffs that are linear in the frequencies, the stable fixed point of the dynamics is given by a distributionx in S n . This is called an evolutionarily stable state (ESS) of the replicator equation ifx T Mx > x T Mx in the local neighborhood ofx. The ESS framework allows us to define an alternative potential function, or Lyapunov function for adaptation, through the use of information-theoretic concepts. We will assume that we are dealing with vector quantities at steady state, and for frugality we will drop the bold notation for vectors. One can think of the potential as "potential information" (a connection hinted at in the Shahshahani connection mentioned above) through use of divergence functions. In particular, let
This is known as the relative entropy [IV.36 §8] or Kullback-Leibler divergence between the two distributions and is also denoted as D KL (x x). Note that it is not symmetric in the arguments. In a statistical setting it is thought of as the information that is lost when approximatingx with x, and it quantifies in log units the additional information required to perfectly match the "optimal," "true," or desired distribution. Differentiating with respect to x yieldsV
Recall that the replicator equation has the formẋ i = x i (m i (x) −m(x)), which upon substitution into the energy function gives uṡ
Since the dynamics are restricted to the simplex, ixi = 1, and given the definition of the meanm(x), we obtainV
as long as the true distributionx is an ESS. For an ESS, the replicator equation will cause a system to adapt toward the fitness function as encoded inx, and it will do so by extracting all information present in the "strategic environment" and storing this information in the population of agents. We can also make the connection to information theory another way, through an identity with mutual information:
where D KL is defined as in (2). As populations evolve they increase the information that they share with their environments, moving away from statistical independence.
One immediate value of an explicitly informational approach is that it can accommodate adaptive dynamics that do not reduce variance but tend to increase it. For example, the rock-paper-scissors game has a Nash equilibrium given by the uniform distribution over strategies. Fisher's fundamental theorem is violated because fitness is now determined by the population composition of strategies, and not by an invariant fitness landscape.
Evolution, Optimization, and Natural Gradients
In the previous discussion we have focused on adaptation in biological systems. The form of the equations of motion has a natural basis in the interaction between replication and competition. The adaptive process was thought of as a variational, i.e., energyminimizing, dynamic that could be described in terms of divergence measures on statistical manifolds. We can, however, arrive at the same structures by considering nonlinear optimization. In this form, rather than emphasize biological properties we emphasize a form of hill-climbing algorithm suitable for dealing with nonconvex optimization or parameter estimation problems based on the so-called natural gradient of information geometry. Standard gradient-based optimization assumes a locally differentiable function with well-behaved first and second derivatives and a search space that is isotropic in the sense that any departure from the optimum leads to an equivalent reduction in the gradient. Discrete-time gradient descent therefore updates solutions (which are still population frequencies in evolutionary systems) X(t) through a recursive algorithm:
X(t + 1) = X(t) − k∇m(X(t)).
These methods work reasonably well for singlepeaked functions in Euclidean spaces. However, for many real-world problems, objective functions are many-peaked, nonisotropic, and live in non-Euclidean spaces. This broader setting means that gradient methods search space according to the Riemannian structure of probabilistic parameter spaces and employ the Fisher metric as the natural measure of distance. This provides information about the curvature of a statistical manifold and promotes more efficient adaptation to the optimum along an appropriate geodesic.
The updating rule for natural gradients includes additional geodesic information, (X(t) ), encoded in the Fisher metric tensor or Fisher information matrix F. It is derived directly from the infinitesimal Kullback-Leibler divergence (shown above to be a suitable Lyapunov function for adaptation) between probability distributions x and y:
This divergence is asymmetric. A true distance can be defined locally. When we expand D KL to a second-order Taylor polynomial,
we see that the first-order term tends to zero for y = x(1 + ε). This leaves us with
Note that ln(y) − ln(x) = ln(1 + ε) ≈ ε, and that ln(y) − ln(x) is simply the derivative of ln(x) in the ε-direction, ∂ ε ln x. Hence,
We are interested in some finite distance between proximate distributions induced by some ε-directional perturbation, y = x(1 + v i ε i ):
By convention, using the definition of partial information, q = − ln(y), the Fisher metric can be written as an expectation value of a quadratic form:
where the expectation value of g(y) is g(y) = g(y)y dy.
Technically, the F ij (y) values are the elements of a positive-definite matrix or Riemannian metric tensor. This tensor captures the curvature of a manifold in N-dimensional space. In Euclidean space this matrix reduces to the identity matrix. Hence, any nonlinear optimization that makes use of the true geometry of a "fitness" function will respect the dynamics of the replicator equation describing trajectories that minimize distances on statistical manifolds.
Adaptive dynamics are, therefore, precisely those trajectories on statistical manifolds that can be said to be maximizing the extraction of information from the environment.
Discrete and Stochastic Considerations
The logic of the continuous systems extends to the discrete case, but the delays intrinsic to maps introduce the possibility of periodic and chaotic behavior. The discrete replicator equation, or replicator mapping, has the form
) = x i (t) + x i (t)((Mx(t)) i − x(t) T Mx(t)).
Even the low-dimensional, two-player discrete game exhibits a full range of complex dynamical behavior. If we consider the parametrized payoff matrix
we can capture a range of so-called evolutionary dilemmas including the "hawk-dove game" (T > 1, S > 0), the "stag hunt game" (T < 1, S > 0), and the "prisoner's dilemma" (T > 1, S < 0). As a general rule, small or negative values of S and T induce periodic solutions, whereas large values of S and T produce chaotic solutions. In the constrained case where T = S = A, systematically increasing the value of A leads to the period-doubling route to chaos. In population genetics, the game selection model is typically written using the equivalent map
Discreteness is important for adaptation. These results illustrate some of the challenges of evolving reliable strategies when fitness is frequency dependent. Deterministic chaos will severely limit the long-term stability of a lineage.
When models incorporate stochasticity, even greater instability ensues. The deterministic results apply most strongly in the limit of large populations overcoming the phenomenon of "neutral drift." If the difference in fitness values or payoff values between strategies is less than O (1/N) , then the dynamics are described by an Ndimensional random walk with the frequencies 0 and 1 acting as absorbing states. In small populations, sampling drift limits adaptation in the sense that we can no longer assume that the dynamics will minimize an appropriate energy function. The smaller the population, the greater the variance in the Malthusian parameters or payoff differences required in order to increase fitness. Stochasticity is treated formally in both the "neutral" and "near-neutral" theories of evolution.
Innovation Dynamics
The systems considered in the previous sections do not attempt to explain the "origin" of adaptations but instead focus on the efficacy of selection in promoting adaptation within an invariant population. In order to explore the origin of adaptive novelty, we need to introduce an intrinsic source of variability. In evolutionary theory this is accomplished by means of mutation and recombination operators. The natural extension of the replication equation to include mutation leads to the quasispecies equatioṅ
The operator Q is a doubly stochastic matrix of transition probabilities encoding mutations from a strain X j → X i . Geometrically, this operator ensures that the boundary of the simplex S n is no longer invariant: trajectories can flow from outside of the positive orthant into S n in such a way that new strains might emerge from existing strains that were not present in the initial population distribution.
In much the same way that neutral drift can eliminate adaptation, excessive mutation can abrogate hill climbing, replacing selection with diffusion over the simplex defined by the mutation kernel Q. This is known as the "error threshold." If each strain is encoded by a binary sequence of length L, then assuming a uniform error rate in transmission across each string, the transition probabilities can by written in binomial form as
where d ij is the Hamming distance between strains, and p is the per bit per generation transition probability. For any choice of fitness function, the regime p > 1/L will completely "flatten" the landscape, eliminating adaptation altogether. This result serves to illustrate costs and benefits of mutational transformation. If mutation is too low, there is a risk of extinction arising from the inability to adapt to a novel environment, whereas if mutation is too high, there is a risk of extinction arising from the complete loss of the adaptive capability through the dissipation of phylogenetic memory. Recombination is formally more cumbersome but plays a role in modulating the rate of evolution within a population of recombining strains. For low rates of mutation, recombination tends to reduce population variability, leading to increased stability. For high rates of mutation that remain below the error threshold, recombination can tip the population over the error threshold and destabilize a population. Hence, rather like mutation, recombination is a double-edged adaptive sword.
Adaptation Is Algorithmic Information Acquisition
We have shown how adaptation represented through a symmetric form of the continuous selection equation (the replicator equation) can be thought of as a natural gradient that minimizes a potential representing information. Adaptive systems are precisely those that extract information from their environments (taken to include other agents) so as to minimize uncertainty. This is made explicit through the fact that the KL divergence between the joint distribution of a pair of random variables and the product distribution of these variables is equal to the mutual information between these variables. Adaptation is therefore measured by the degree of departure from independence of organisms and their environments, or from each other. In this framework, adaptation continues (driving up the mutual information) until there is no further functional information to be acquired and, thus, no latent dependencies remaining to be discovered. This is unlikely to occur in reality as environments are rarely static over long intervals of time. The very general nature of adaptation suggests that it might manifest in a variety of forms, and this is exactly what we find: adaptive dynamics possesses a number of "avatars," each of which is a framework for obtaining information through the iteration of a simple growth and culling process. In this section we present a few of the mathematical avatars of replicator dynamics in order to demonstrate that adaptation is a ubiquitous nonlinear optimization procedure across a range of fields, many of which appear to be unrelated. This reduction to a canonical adaptive form constitutes evidence of functional equivalence with respect to information extraction in the service of increased prevalence, which should rightly be thought of as adaptive evolution.
Bayesian Inference
In 1763, Bayes's posthumous paper "An essay towards solving a problem in the doctrine of changes" was published in the Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society. The paper presented a novel method for calculating probabilities with minimal or no knowledge of an event and indicated how repeated experiments can lead toward the confirmation of a conclusion.
bayes's rule [V.11 §1] is the engine behind what we now call Bayesian updating and, when appropriately written, it is revealed to be a natural mathematical encoding of adaptation. In other words, it is an information-maximizing dynamic induced on the simplex. In dynamical terms it is a discrete particle system that through repeated iteration converges on an effective estimate of a true underlying probability distribution.
Whereas we think of adaptation in terms of the differential success of organisms, Bayesian updating treats adaptation as the differential success of hypotheses.
The basic updating equation is
with the change in the concentration of the probability mass P (X) delivered around the highest likelihood L(X) values:
Note that the evolution of the probability distribution in continuous time reduces to the simplest form of the differential replicator equation:
Bayes therefore constructed an adaptive avatar avante le lettre of Darwin's theory. A method for estimating the probability of a hypothesis through trial and error is the prequel to the differential replication of natural selection.
Imitation
In much the same way that Bayesian updating is an avatar of adaptation, learning through imitation similarly qualifies. Imitation is a cognitive strategy for arriving at a pattern of behavior based on sampling a population of model behaviors. After sufficient time has elapsed, the most prevalent behavior will be the one most frequently imitated.
Assume that each individual i varies in its strategy choices s i . Think of this as a vector specifying a mixed strategy defining how individuals should interact. Interactions between strategies s i and s j give rise to pairwise payoffs or rewards r ij . Reward information is used to decide which strategy to adopt in subsequent interactions. In particular, differences in payoffs lead to the adoption of more successful strategies. The rate of imitation leading strategy j to imitate a strategy i, s j → s i , can therefore be written in matrix form:
where R is the matrix of rewards and g the vector of genotypic or strategic frequencies. Notice that this function is only nonzero in the positive half-space, so lower payoff strategies are not imitated. The population of players will evolve in time according to an imitation learning dynamics that is easily seen to reduce to the game dynamical form of the replicator equation:
Reinforcement Learning
Skinner introduced the linear operator model of reinforcement to explain schedules of behavioral extinction and acquisition, and this framework has been enormously influential, giving rise to a very large class of learning rules. Any behavior that is correct is rewarded, while incorrect behavior is punished. Over time, reinforcement seeks to make correct behavior probable and incorrect behavior improbable. Consider a set of behaviors X i each associated with a probability x i . For each behavior there is a reward r i . The incremental change in the probability of any action, with a learning rate parameter α, can be written as
where δ ij is the kronecker delta [I.2 §2, table 3]. This gives the updated probability of behavior assuming that a single action was performed. The average change of behavior takes into account the probability of an action x i :
Combining these two equations we deduce that
The term i x i r i is simply the mean reward, r , and the change in behavior in continuous time is given by the simple replicator equatioṅ
As with Bayesian updating and imitation learning, reinforcement learning is an algorithm for iteratively forming an accurate estimate of an underlying probability distribution imposed through a learning environment.
Final Remarks
In all that precedes we have focused on a very general context of adaptation and the related mathematics. This was the most expansive framing of adaptation as a form of optimization subject to the constraints of probability. When presented in this way we observe that adaptation is not unique to biology but is a ubiquitous phenomenon in nature. One might go so far as to assert that the property of adaptation is the defining signature of life in the universe and that the mathematics of adaptation represents a form of algorithmic biological law.
Many have explored the mathematics of complex adaptive systems, placing an emphasis on questions of "emergence." These are systems for which, as Nobel laureate Phil Anderson famously wrote "more is different" or "the whole is greater than the sum of the parts," a descriptor that suggests the variety of nonlinear phenomena they comprise. The formal relationship between emergence and adaptive dynamics remains somewhat unclear.
Familiar examples of such systems run the gamut from Ising models to economies. They are often characterized by hierarchical and multiscale structure as well as hysteresis. They have generally emerged over time and space, most through processes related to those that we have discussed, namely feedback and adaptation.
The mathematical framework presented above is a necessary component in the analysis of all such systems, but not all consider the process of evolution explicitly, or they prefer simulation approaches such as agent-based models and genetic or evolutionary programming. These involve the disciplines of programming and consideration of more sophisticated distributed algorithms.
Further Reading
The bibliography below contains some excellent general resources on the ideas presented in this entry.
The exposition of section 2.1 follows closely the exposition presented in Hofbauer and Sigmund (1998) . Section 5 follows the contents of the review by Krakauer (2011) , which places the study of selection mechanics in the larger context of the study of complex elaborations of Maxwell's demon.
